“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies

Abstract

Abstract:Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model -based on self-interest -fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life.

Towards a unified science of cultural evolution

“…The latter encompasses a wide range of research styles, some of which differ markedly from ethnographic fieldwork -particularly in the degree to which they employ a "topdown" rather than a "bottom-up" approach. Thus, questionnaire-based studies (e.g., Hewlett & Cavalli-Sforza 1986), psychological experiments (e.g., Barrett 2004), and economic games (Henrich et al 2005) in small-scale societies are designed to investigate specific anthropological problems using highly structured data-collection strategies that are implemented over relatively short periods of time. The time frame of ethnographic research is much greater, requiring months and often years of fieldwork, the aims and outcomes of which are only loosely contained within the parameters set by a predetermined research question.…”

Using crowdsourced online experiments to study context-dependency of behavior

“…Only recently have cross-country comparisons of laboratory results provided indications regarding regional variation of behavior (e.g. Brandts et al, 2004;Henrich et al, 2005;Kocher et al, 2008). Still, commentators see experimentation at multiple locations as largely speculative (e.g.…”

“…Above all Henrich et al (2005Henrich et al ( , 2010 have added to our understanding of culturally molded decision-making and its interaction with socio-economic development. However, cross-regional comparisons for estimating effects of living conditions and cultural patterns on economic behavior have run into obstacles due to limited transferability of standardized decision situations into parallel laboratory set-ups (e.g.…”

“…We expect norm adherence to vary with regional socio-economic conditions (Bicchieri, 2006;Henrich et al, 2005). Selection of context variables requires theoretical guidance (an important issue we elaborate further in the concluding section).…”

“…UG and DG thus reveal expectations about valid social norms in a particular population (Bicchieri, 2006;Elster, 2007;Henrich et al, 2005). 1 We use bargaining games specifically because norms of fairness are strongly conditional on local context: Subjects' tendency to adhere depends on beliefs of others' compliance and others' normative expectations (Bicchieri, 2006;Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009).…”