It is time to combine the two main traditions in the research on the neural correlates of consciousness: C = L × D

Abstract

Research on neural correlates of consciousness has been conducted and carried out mostly from within two relatively autonomous paradigmatic traditions – studying the specific contents of conscious experience and their brain-process correlates and studying the level of consciousness. In the present paper we offer a theoretical integration suggesting that an emphasis has to be put on understanding the mechanisms of consciousness (and not a mere correlates) and in doing this, the two paradigmatic traditions must be combined. We argue that consciousness emerges as a result of interaction of brain mechanisms specialized for representing the specific contents of perception/cognition – the data – and mechanisms specialized for regulating the level of activity of whatever data the content-carrying specific mechanisms happen to represent. Each of these mechanisms are necessary because without the contents there is no conscious experience and without the required level of activity the processed contents remain unconscious. Together the two mechanisms, when activated up to a necessary degree each, provide conditions sufficient for conscious experience to emerge. This proposal is related to pertinent experimental evidence.

Cognitive functions of intracellular mechanisms for contextual amplification

“…If there is also sufficient modulatory input to the apical dendrites, however, then this amplifies neuronal output, thus producing the integrative computation experienced as being more conscious, flexible, and context-sensitive. Bachmann and Hudetz (2014) present several arguments in support of their hypothesis. First, anesthetics greatly reduce N1 and these effects are strongly correlated with the extent to which those anesthetics affect dendritic calcium spikes.…”

“…It has often been suggested that consciousness involves an interaction between feedforward and feedback signals, and this is at the center of the theory of consciousness proposed by Bachmann and Hudetz (2014). Put simply, their central hypothesis is that basal inputs specify the contents of consciousness and apical inputs determine the level of consciousness.…”

On the functions, mechanisms, and malfunctions of intracortical contextual modulation

“…It is also possible that the dynamic formation of widely distributed but transient coalitions of mutually supportive activities by long-range gamma-synchronization is a neural correlate of sensory awareness and consciousness (Engel and Singer, 2001;Koch, 2004;Melloni, et al 2007). Furthermore, apical amplification may be a major determinant of the level of consciousness reached by any given content at any given moment (Bachmann and Hudetz, 2014).…”

Healing Dysfunctional Identity: Bridging Mind-Body Intervention to Brain Systems

“…action plans) ensue, 2) from unrealistic expectations realistic perceptions are erroneously missed while unrealistic perceptions are superstitiously reified, 3) from these mistakes in perceptions some erroneous actions are planned and taken, and 4) from mistaken actions some undesirable outcomes ensue. From experiencing undesirable outcomes, one arrives at a pivot point, either holding on to the momentum of ongoing unrealistic expectations and actions, or pausing and learning to correct mistakes and update expectations until they become realistically valid.…”

“…According to the emerging literature of how consciousness arises, mental phenomena or images become part of one's subjective experience (a.k.a. consciousness), resulting from the "yoking" of top-down expectation and bottom-up data in the brain [3] [4]. The "yoking" not only occurs in a single unit of cortical area, called the cortical column, but also in long-range cortical-cortical connections between cortical networks [5] [6].…”