Elicitation of Preferences 1999
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1406-8_2
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The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework

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Cited by 1,055 publications
(1,061 citation statements)
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References 87 publications
(24 reference statements)
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“…This conclusion is similar to that reached by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) after an extensive review of the literature on financial incentives in experimental economics more generally. They concluded that methods involving hypothetical choices and those involving real consequences typically yield qualitatively similar results.…”
Section: Are These Procedures Realistic?supporting
confidence: 88%
“…This conclusion is similar to that reached by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) after an extensive review of the literature on financial incentives in experimental economics more generally. They concluded that methods involving hypothetical choices and those involving real consequences typically yield qualitatively similar results.…”
Section: Are These Procedures Realistic?supporting
confidence: 88%
“…readily satiated‖ (Smith, 1976, p. 277). Incentives reduce the variance in participants' behavior and generally improve decision making, bringing decisions closer to predictions of rational choice theory and game theory (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999;Smith & Walker, 1993), especially in tasks of intermediate difficulty (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001).…”
Section: Rationale For Current Researchmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…individual motivations not restricted to one's own well-being but including the well-being of others (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). Marginal totals are well-documented for various populations (Camerer, 2003;Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008;Henrich et al, 2010) and stake levels (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999;Carpenter et al, 2005). Each protocol is easily understandable by participants of different social backgrounds and training.…”
Section: Experimental Gamesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Experimentalists typically assume that participants will more likely adhere to social norms in hypothetical allocation games than when real money is at stake (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999;Heyman and Ariely, 2004). As the costs of both fairness and informal sanctioning increase we should find less socially desirable behavior in high-stakes decisions.…”
Section: Monetary Stakesmentioning
confidence: 99%