Human faces, and more specifically the eyes, play a crucial role in social and nonverbal communication because they signal valuable information about others. It is therefore surprising that few studies have investigated the impact of intergroup contexts and motivations on attention to the eyes of ingroup and outgroup members. Four experiments investigated differences in eye gaze to racial and novel ingroups using eye tracker technology. Whereas Studies 1 and 3 demonstrated that White participants attended more to the eyes of White compared to Black targets, Study 2 showed a similar pattern of attention to the eyes of novel ingroup and outgroup faces. Studies 3 and 4 also provided new evidence that eye gaze is flexible and can be meaningfully influenced by current motivations. Specifically, instructions to individuate specific social categories increased attention to the eyes of target group members. Furthermore, the latter experiments demonstrated that preferential attention to the eyes of ingroup members predicted important intergroup biases such as recognition of ingroup over outgroup faces (i.e., the Own Race Bias; Study 3) and willingness to interact with outgroup members (Study 4). The implication of these findings for general theorizing on face perception, individuation processes, and intergroup relations are discussed.Keywords: intergroup bias, social categorization, individuation, prejudice, Own Race Bias, face perception, social vision PREFERENTIAL ATTENTION TO THE EYES OF INGROUP MEMBERS 3An Eye for the I: Preferential Attention to the Eyes of Ingroup MembersThe human face is arguably the most important of all social stimuli because it is such a rich source of information. Faces, and more specifically the eyes, play crucial roles in social and nonverbal communication, signaling valuable information about others (Adams & Kleck, 2003Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, & Hess, 2010). Despite the key role that the eyes play in social cognition, few studies have investigated the impact of intergroup contexts and motivation on attention to the eyes of ingroup and outgroup members. Although research has convincingly demonstrated that perceivers are better at understanding and extracting information from faces that belong to ingroups relative to outgroups (Adams, Franklin, Nelson, & Stevenson, 2010;Chiao et al., 2008;, it remains unclear how people process faces from their own and other categories and whether distinct patterns of attention to specific facial features exist for these groups.The current research seeks to address this gap directly. To this end, we first provide a general review of the literature regarding the central role of the eyes in social perception, and in particular, their role when perceiving ingroup and outgroup members. Then we move to a discussion regarding the impact of motivation on eye gaze and the relationship between eye gaze, and two important intergroup biases: the Own Race Bias (Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010;Meissner & Brigham, 2001;Sporer, 2001) and a willing...

This research explored the influence of empathic distress on prosocial behavior in a resource allocation task with children. Children were randomly assigned to one of two conditions before engaging in a sticker sharing task; watching either a video of a girl upset that her dog had gone missing (emotion induction condition), or a video of the same girl preparing for a yard sale (control condition). In study one, 5–6 year old children in the emotion induction condition rated the emotional state of both the protagonist and the self more negatively, and also exhibited more prosocial behavior; sharing more in advantageous inequity (AI) trials, and less often withholding a benefit in disadvantageous inequity trials, than the control group. Prosocial behavior was significantly correlated with ratings of the emotional state of the protagonist but not with own emotional state, suggesting that empathic concern rather than personal distress was the primary influence on prosocial behavior. In study two, 3-year-olds were tested on AI trials alone, and like the 5 and 6-year-olds, showed more prosocial behavior in the emotion induction condition than the control.

The authors explored the differential emergence and correlates of racial stereotyping in 136 children ages 4–11 years across two broad social contexts: Hawai‘i and Massachusetts. Children completed measures assessing race salience, race essentialism, and in-group and out-group stereotyping. Results indicated that the type of racial stereotypes emerging with age was context dependent. In both contexts in-group stereotyping increased with age. By contrast, there was only an age-related increase in out-group stereotyping in Massachusetts. Older children in Massachusetts reported more essentialist thinking (i.e., believing that race cannot change) than their counterparts in Hawai’i, which explained their higher out-group stereotyping. These results provide insight into the factors that may shape contextual differences in racial stereotyping.

The ability to discriminate visually based on race emerges early in infancy: 3-month-olds can perceptually differentiate faces by race and 6-month-olds can perceptually categorize faces by race. Between ages 6 and 8 years, children can sort others into racial groups. But to what extent are these abilities influenced by context? In this article, we review studies on children's racial categorization and discuss how our conclusions are affected by how we ask the questions (i.e., our methods and stimuli), where we ask them (i.e., the diversity of the child's surrounding environment), and whom we ask (i.e., the diversity of the children we study). Taken together, we suggest that despite a developmental readiness to categorize others by race, the use of race as a psychologically salient basis for categorization is far from inevitable and is shaped largely by the experimental setting and the greater cultural context.

The present research comprises six experiments that investigated racial biases in the perception of positive emotional expressions. In an initial study, we demonstrated that White participants distinguished more in their happiness ratings of Duchenne ("true") and non-Duchenne ("false") smiles on White compared with Black faces (Experiment 1). In a subsequent study we replicated this effect using a different set of stimuli and non-Black participants (Experiment 2). As predicted, this bias was not demonstrated by Black participants, who did not significantly differ in happiness ratings between smile types on White and Black faces (Experiment 3). Furthermore, in addition to happiness ratings, we demonstrated that non-Black participants were also more accurate when categorizing true versus false expressions on White compared with Black faces (Experiment 4). The final two studies provided evidence for the mediating role of attention to the eyes in intergroup emotion identification. In particular, eye tracking data indicated that White participants spent more time attending to the eyes of White than Black faces and that attention to the eyes predicted biases in happiness ratings between true and false smiles on White and Black faces (Experiment 5). Furthermore, an experimental manipulation focusing participants on the eyes of targets eliminated the effects of target race or perceptions of happiness (Experiment 6). Together, the findings provide novel evidence for racial biases in the identification of positive emotions and highlight the critical role of visual attention in this process.

The goal of this research was to examine children's implicit racial attitudes. Across three studies, a total of 359 White 5- to 12-year-olds completed child-friendly exemplar (Affective Priming Task; Affect Misattribution Procedure) and category-based (Implicit Association Test) implicit measures of racial attitudes. Younger children (5- to 8-year-olds) showed automatic ingroup positivity toward White child exemplars, whereas older children (9- to 12-year-olds) did not. Children also showed no evidence of automatic negativity toward Black exemplars, despite demonstrating consistent pro-White versus Black bias on the category-based measure. Together, the results suggest that (a) implicit ingroup and outgroup attitudes can follow distinct developmental trajectories, and (b) the spontaneous activation of implicit intergroup attitudes can depend on the salience of race.

General rightsThis document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms RACIAL MICROAGGRESSIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNET MEMES 2 AbstractAlthough more blatant forms of discrimination have declined, racial prejudice continues to manifest itself in subtle ways. For example, People of Color experience racial microaggressions (i.e., subtle slights or 'put downs') in their face-to-face interactions (Nadal, 2011) and in online contexts (Clark et al., 2011). This study investigates whether experiencing subtle racial discrimination offline can influence perceptions of online content, specifically racial themed Internet memes. Results indicate that although both People of Color and Whites viewed racial themed memes to be more offensive than non-racial themed memes (control images), for People of Color the ratings of racial themed memes were predicted by previous discrimination; those who reported experiencing more racial microaggressions in everyday settings rated racial themed memes as more offensive. The same pattern of results did not emerge for ratings of non-racial themed memes or for White participants. These results provide initial evidence that experiencing racial microaggressions in offline interactions may lead individuals from racial minority groups to be more likely to perceive racial discrimination in online settings.Word Count: 169/200

Why do people fail to engage in positive behaviors which will promote their health and well-being? Researchers addressing this question adopt primarily one of two perspectives, drawing either on theories of health behavior, such as the Health Belief Model (HBM), or on theories of risk perception, such as unrealistic optimism. To overcome this compartmentalization, two studies of cancer screening behavior assessed the extent to which unrealistic optimism occurred in relation to each of the elements of the HBM: severity and curability of cancer and the benefits of, and barriers to, having a screening test. Data were collected using telephone interviews, dialing numbers randomly selected from the telephone directory. In the first study 164 women aged 50 to 70 years responded to questions about breast cancer and screening mammography, while in the second study 200 men aged 45 to 60 years responded to questions about prostate cancer and screening using the prostate specific antigen test. Women had an optimistic bias in relation to breast cancer risk and severity and barriers to having a screening mammogram but not in relation to the benefits of screening. For prostate cancer, there was an optimistic bias for all HBM variables: risk and severity of prostate cancer and barriers to and benefits of screening. It was concluded that unrealistic optimism is broader than perceived risk, being evident for all elements of the HBM.