Children tend to choose an unfamiliar object rather than a familiar one when asked to find the referent of a novel name. This response has been taken as evidence for the operation of certain lexical constraints in children's inferences of word meanings. The present studies test an alternative-pragmatic-explanation of this phenomenon among 3-year-olds. In Study 1 children responded to a request for the referent of a novel label in the same way that they responded to a request for the referent of a novel fact. Study 2 intimated that children assume that labels are common knowledge among members of the same language community. Study 3 demonstrated that shared knowledge between a speaker and listener plays a decisive role in how children interpret a speaker's request. The findings suggest that 3-year-olds' avoidance of lexical overlap is not unique to naming and may derive from children's sensitivity to speakers' communicative intentions.How do children learn the meaning of words so efficiently given the complexity of the contexts in which most new words are encountered? One prevailing answer to this question is that children's inferences about word meanings are guided by a set of internal lexical constraints, biases, or principles that allow children to bypass consideration of most of the logically plausible meanings of a word (Golinkoff, Mervis, & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994;Markman, 1989;Waxman, 1990). For instance, it is argued that children believe that words denote whole objects, that labels refer to categories of objects rather than to individual objects, and that every object has only one name. A second line of thinking points out that young children are knowledgeable about various communication practices and are sensitive to a number of pragmatic cues present in the discourse context that indicate a speaker's communicative intent (L. Bloom, 1998). For instance, young children attend to the direction of a speaker's eye gaze to establish the referent of the speaker's utterance (Baldwin, 1993), they are sensitive to a speaker's affective and behavioral expressions as indicative of whether his or her communicative intent was accomplished (Tomasello,
Four studies examined whether Israeli 5-year-olds (N = 88) and adults (N = 48) drew inferences about psychological properties based on a character's social category, personality trait, or physical appearance trait. Study 1 revealed that while children drew inferences mostly by social category, adults did it by personality trait. Study 2 showed that the children's pattern was not due to how the categorical information was conveyed. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that for kindergarteners, labels, not appearances, are determinant of the inductive potential of social categories. Studies indicated that "Jew" and "Arab" were the most inductively powerful social categories for both children and adults. The results carry implications for the roles of language, appearances, and culture in the conceptualization of "human kinds."
Children tend to extend object names on the basis of sameness of shape, rather than size, color, or material-a tendency that has been dubbed the "shape bias." Is the shape bias the result of well-learned associations between words and objects? Or does it exist because of a general belief that shape is a good indicator of object category membership? The present three studies addressed this debate by exploring whether the shape bias is specific to naming. In Study 1, 3-year-olds showed the shape bias both when asked to extend a novel name and when asked to select an object of the same kind as a target object. Study 2 found the same shape bias when children were asked to generalize properties relevant to category membership. Study 3 replicated the findings from Study 1 with 2-year-olds. These findings suggest that the shape bias derives from children's beliefs about object kinds and is not the product of associative learning.
Two studies examined the inductive potential of various social categories among 144 kindergarten, 2nd‐, and 6th‐grade Israeli children from 3 sectors: secular Jews, religious Jews, and Muslim Arabs. Study 1—wherein social categories were labeled—found that ethnic categories were the most inductively powerful, especially for religious Jewish children. Study 2—wherein no social category labels were provided—found no differences across sectors either in the inductive potential of ethnic categories or in children’s capacity to visually recognize social categories. These results stress the importance of labels and cultural background in children’s beliefs about social categories. The implications of these findings for accounts of the development of social essentialism are discussed.
When children learn a name for a novel artifact, they tend to extend the name to other artifacts that share the same shape--a phenomenon known as the shape bias. The present studies investigated an intentional account of this bias. In Study 1, 3-year-olds were shown two objects of the same shape, and were given an explanation for why the objects were the same shape even though they were intended to be different kinds. The shape bias disappeared in children provided with this explanation. In Study 2, 3-year-olds were shown triads of objects, and were either given no information about the function of a named target object, told the function that object could fulfill, or told the functions all three objects were intended to fulfill. Only in the third condition did children overcome a shape bias in favor of a function bias when extending the name of the target object. These findings indicate that 3-year-olds' shape bias results from intuitions about what artifacts were intended to be.
In Study 1, 4-year-olds avoided 2 names for an object when exposed to a common or a proper noun in a puppet's presence or to a common noun in a puppet's absence, but not when exposed to a proper noun in a puppet's absence. In Study 2, 3-year-olds avoided 2 names for an object when the requester for the referent of a second label in a different language was bilingual and present during naming, but not when the speaker was bilingual but absent or monolingual. Study 3 followed up on the results of the first 2 studies. When children could assume that the puppet knew the name the experimenter used, they inferred that the puppet's use of a different name implied a different referential intent.
The present study compared 5- and 10-year-old North American and Israeli children's beliefs about the objectivity of different categories. Children saw picture-triads composed of two exemplars of the same category (e.g., two women), and an exemplar of a contrasting category (e.g., a man). Children were asked whether it would be acceptable or wrong for people in a different country to consider contrasting exemplars to be the same kind. We found that children from both countries viewed gender as objectively correct and occupation as flexible. The findings regarding race and ethnicity differed in the two countries, revealing how an essentialist bias interacts with cultural input in directing children's conceptualization of social groups.
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