There have been numerous attempts to explain the enigma of autism, but existing neurocognitive theories often provide merely a refined description of 1 cluster of symptoms. Here we argue that deficits in executive functioning, theory of mind, and central coherence can all be understood as the consequence of a core deficit in the flexibility with which people with autism spectrum disorder can process violations to their expectations. More formally we argue that the human mind processes information by making and testing predictions and that the errors resulting from violations to these predictions are given a uniform, inflexibly high weight in autism spectrum disorder. The complex, fluctuating nature of regularities in the world and the stochastic and noisy biological system through which people experience it require that, in the real world, people not only learn from their errors but also need to (meta-)learn to sometimes ignore errors. Especially when situations (e.g., social) or stimuli (e.g., faces) become too complex or dynamic, people need to tolerate a certain degree of error in order to develop a more abstract level of representation. Starting from an inability to flexibly process prediction errors, a number of seemingly core deficits become logically secondary symptoms. Moreover, an insistence on sameness or the acting out of stereotyped and repetitive behaviors can be understood as attempts to provide a reassuring sense of predictive success in a world otherwise filled with error. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).

Psychology moved beyond the stimulus response mapping of behaviorism by adopting an information processing framework. This shift from behavioral to cognitive science was partly inspired by work demonstrating that the concept of information could be defined and quantified (Shannon, 1948). This transition developed further from cognitive science into cognitive neuroscience, in an attempt to measure information in the brain. In the cognitive neurosciences, however, the term information is often used without a clear definition. This paper will argue that, if the formulation proposed by Shannon is applied to modern neuroimaging, then numerous results would be interpreted differently. More specifically, we argue that much modern cognitive neuroscience implicitly focuses on the question of how we can interpret the activations we record in the brain (experimenter-as-receiver), rather than on the core question of how the rest of the brain can interpret those activations (cortex-as-receiver). A clearer focus on whether activations recorded via neuroimaging can actually act as information in the brain would not only change how findings are interpreted but should also change the direction of empirical research in cognitive neuroscience.

Polarization is one of the biggest societal challenges of our time, yet its drivers are poorly understood. Here we propose a novel approachcomputational political psychologywhich uses behavioural tasks in combination with formal computational models in order to identify candidate cognitive processes that underpin susceptibility to polarized beliefs about political and societal issues.

Pellicano and Burr (2012) argue that a Bayesian framework can help us understand the perceptual peculiarities in autism. We agree, but we think that their assumption of uniformly flat or equivocal priors in autism is not empirically supported. Moreover, we argue that any full account has to take into consideration not only the nature of priors in autism, but also how these priors are constructed or learned. We argue that predictive coding provides a more constrained framework that very naturally explains how priors are constructed in autism leading to strong, but overfitted, and non-generalizable predictions.

Activity in the primary visual cortex reduces when certain stimuli can be perceptually organized as a unified Gestalt. This reduction could offer important insights into the nature of feedback computations within the human visual system; however, the properties of this response reduction have not yet been investigated in detail. Here we replicate this reduced V1 response, but find that the modulation in V1 (and V2) to the perceived organization of the input is not specific to the retinotopic location at which the sensory input from that stimulus is represented. Instead, we find a response modulation that is equally evident across the primary visual cortex. Thus in contradiction to some models of hierarchical predictive coding, the perception of an organized Gestalt causes a broad feedback effect that does not act specifically on the part of the retinotopic map representing the sensory input.

Neuropsychological diagnostic tests of visual perception mostly assess high-level processes like object recognition. Object recognition, however, relies on distinct mid-level processes of perceptual organization that are only implicitly tested in classical tests. The Leuven Perceptual Organization Screening Test (L-POST) fills a gap with respect to clinically oriented tests of mid-level visual function. In 15 online subtests, a range of mid-level processes are covered, such as figure-ground segmentation, local and global processing, and shape perception. We also test the sensitivity to a wide variety of perceptual grouping cues, like common fate, collinearity, proximity, and closure. To reduce cognitive load, a matching-to-sample task is used for all subtests. Our online test can be administered in 20-45 min and is freely available at www.gestaltrevision.be/tests . The online implementation enables us to offer a separate interface for researchers and clinicians to have immediate access to the raw and summary results for each patient and to keep a record of their patient's entire data. Also, each patient's results can be flexibly compared with a range of age-matched norm samples. In conclusion, the L-POST is a valuable screening test for perceptual organization. The test allows clinicians to screen for deficits in visual perception and enables researchers to get a broader overview of mid-level visual processes that are preserved or disrupted in a given patient.

BackgroundThe Embedded Figures Test (EFT, developed by Witkin and colleagues (1971)) has been used extensively in research on individual differences, particularly in the study of autism spectrum disorder. The EFT was originally conceptualized as a measure of field (in)dependence, but in recent years performance on the EFT has been interpreted as a measure of local versus global perceptual style. Although many have used the EFT to measure perceptual style, relatively few have focused on understanding the stimulus features that cause a shape to become embedded. The primary aim of this work was to investigate the relation between the strength of embedding and perceptual grouping on a group level.MethodNew embedded figure stimuli (both targets and contexts) were developed in which stimulus features that may influence perceptual grouping were explicitly manipulated. The symmetry, closure and complexity of the target shape were manipulated as well as its good continuation by varying the number of lines from the target that continued into the context. We evaluated the effect of these four stimulus features on target detection in a new embedded figures task (Leuven Embedded Figures Test, L-EFT) in a group of undergraduate psychology students. The results were then replicated in a second experiment using a slightly different version of the task.ResultsStimulus features that influence perceptual grouping, especially good continuation and symmetry, clearly affected performance (lower accuracy, slower response times) on the L-EFT. Closure did not yield results in line with our predictions.DiscussionThese results show that some stimulus features, which are known to affect perceptual grouping, also influence how effectively a stimulus becomes embedded in different contexts. Whether these results imply that the EFT measures individual differences in perceptual grouping ability must be further investigated.

Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is a powerful interocular suppression technique, which is often described as an effective means to reliably suppress stimuli from visual awareness. Suppression through CFS has been assumed to depend upon a reduction in (retinotopically specific) neural adaptation caused by the continual updating of the contents of the visual input to one eye. In this study, we started from the observation that suppressing a moving stimulus through CFS appeared to be more effective when using a mask that was actually more prone to retinotopically specific neural adaptation, but in which the properties of the mask were more similar to those of the to-be-suppressed stimulus. In two experiments, we find that using a moving Mondrian mask (i.e., one that includes motion) is more effective in suppressing a moving stimulus than a regular CFS mask. The observed pattern of results cannot be explained by a simple simulation that computes the degree of retinotopically specific neural adaptation over time, suggesting that this kind of neural adaptation does not play a large role in predicting the differences between conditions in this context. We also find some evidence consistent with the idea that the most effective CFS mask is the one that matches the properties (speed) of the suppressed stimulus. These results question the general importance of retinotopically specific neural adaptation in CFS, and potentially help to explain an implicit trend in the literature to adapt one’s CFS mask to match one’s to-be-suppressed stimuli. Finally, the results should help to guide the methodological development of future research where continuous suppression of moving stimuli is desired.