This article introduces the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset (PAM_ID). We present time-series data on the implementation of 51 provisions in 34 comprehensive peace agreements negotiated in civil wars since 1989. We follow the implementation process for up to ten years following the signing of each agreement. The data provide new insights into the types of provisions that are more or less likely to be implemented, how implementation processes unfold over time, how implementation processes relate to one another, and how implementation affects various post-accord outcomes. We outline our coding methodology and case selection, and examine descriptive statistics. We illustrate one potential use of the data by combining eight different provisions into a composite indicator of security sector reform (SSR). A survival analysis finds that implementing security sector reforms contributes to long-term conflict reduction not only between the parties to the accord but also between the government and other non-signatory groups in the same conflict.

The signing of a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) is often seen as a historic milestone in a peace process, and its implementation takes a highly legitimized set of reforms and puts it front and center in national politics. This article examines the aggregate implementation of CPAs signed since 1989 and future conflict behavior between the negotiating parties and between the government and non-signatory groups. It argues that implementation is both a peace-building process and an outcome that normalizes political relations between hostile groups, solves commitment problems and addresses the root causes of civil conflict. Statistical tests utilizing new data on the implementation of CPAs support the argument. The extent to which an agreement is implemented is shown to have significant long-term effects on how long peace lasts – an effect that applies not only to the signatories of the agreement, but also to the government and non-signatory groups.

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This article presents the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), a database of comprehensive peace agreements and their implementation, covering the years between 1989 and 2007. PAM identifies more than 51 elements that have appeared in peace agreements and collects data that can be used to analyse and compare peace accords. The matrix also monitors the extent to which the agreements have been implemented. Because of these capabilities, PAM is ideal for researchers who want to examine aspects of peace agreements and the implementation of particular provisions, which either help or hinder peace processes in post-accord periods. PAM is also useful for facilitators and mediators who are engaged in the peace process, both prior to and after an agreement is signed, as it provides information on how other countries have previously attempted peace processes. PAM data can be a very useful tool to design better peace accords and to ensure the implementation of accords.

We examine the ways in which the size of the governing coalition in a post-civil war state affects the durability of the peace. Previous studies relate the durability of the peace to the outcome of the civil war, the extent and forms of power-sharing arrangements, and the role of third-party security guarantors. We argue that the way conflict terminates and the power-sharing agreements between former protagonists structure the composition of governing coalition in the post-civil war state. Any settlement to civil war that broadens the size of the governing coalition should increase actors' incentives to sustain the peace rather than renew the armed conflict. Peace is more likely to fail where the governing coalition is smaller because those excluded from the governing coalition have little to lose from resuming armed rebellion. To test these propositions, we analyze data on post-civil war peace spells from 1946-2005. KEYWORDS civil war settlements, power-sharing, size of governing coalition, survival of peaceBuilding peace in the aftermath of a civil war is not impossible, but it is challenging to bring former enemies together in a post-war peace process. It is even more challenging to build a structure of peace that is durable. There are

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The Maoist insurgency in Nepal presents an anomaly for students of civil war and democratic transitions. How was the Maoist wing of the Nepal Communist Party able to mobilize peasants to support their insurgency when they could not mobilize enough peasants to vote for them in elections? The authors address these questions by exploring the ways in which the persistence of traditional clientelist networks in the countryside enabled rural elites to mobilize peasants to vote for parties other than the Maoist party, even though peasants would have benefited from that party's advocacy for land reform. When that same party used insurgent violence against rural elites, peasants were willing and able to support the insurgency and abstain from voting in the 1999 election in locales where the insurgency succeeded in disrupting clientelist ties. The authors test these arguments with district-level data on election turnout and the distribution of households among several land-tenure categories. Findings support the argument that turnout was greater where land-tenure patterns gave landed elite greater influence over peasant political behavior. Where higher levels of insurgent violence disrupted patterns of clientelist dependency, turnout declined. What electoral democracy could not deliver to peasants — land reform and relief from clientelist dependency — the Maoist insurgency promised to bring through political violence.

This article examines the ways in which United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions affect democratic progress and the durability of peace in post–civil war states. After a conflict, UN peacekeeping missions provide security and create incentives for former actors to resolve their differences through peaceful and democratic means. This article contends that by providing support, peacekeeping missions help to initiate a democratic process such that former rivals can claim access to power and resources without resorting to armed conflict. To arrive at this conclusion, this article empirically examines whether UN peacekeeping missions succeeded in promoting democratic progress in postwar states and, subsequently, whether that democratic progress would contribute to the durability of peace. The indirect effect of peacekeeping on stable peace has not been explored in the literature surrounding democratic progress and the durability of peace. From the analysis of the data on post–civil war democratic progress and the durability of peace from 1946 to 2005, I find support for the alternative approach and conclude that UN missions contribute to durable peace in post–civil war states by promoting democratic political processes.