We conducted a series of activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analyses to determine the commonalities and distinctions between separate levels of emotion perception, namely incidental perception, passive perception, and explicit evaluation of emotional expressions. Pooling together more than 180 neuroimaging experiments using facial, vocal or body expressions, our results are threefold. First, explicitly evaluating the emotions of others recruits brain regions associated with the sensory processing of expressions, such as the inferior occipital gyrus, middle fusiform gyrus and the superior temporal gyrus, and brain regions involved in low-level and high-level mindreading, namely the posterior superior temporal sulcus, the inferior frontal cortex and dorsomedial frontal cortex. Second, we show that only the sensory regions were also consistently active during the passive perception of emotional expressions. Third, we show that the brain regions involved in mindreading were active during the explicit evaluation of both facial and vocal expressions. We discuss these results in light of the existing literature and conclude by proposing a cognitive model for perceiving and evaluating the emotions of others.

People can be overly optimistic not only about their own future but also for the people with whom they identify. Furthermore, interpersonal perception generally forms along two universal dimensions, i.e. warmth and competence. In this study, we created four fictional characters that would map onto each quadrant of the two-dimensional space of warmth and competence, i.e. one in-group member (high on both warmth and competence) and three out-group members (high warmth, low competence; high competence, low warmth; low on both warmth and competence). We then asked respondents to assess the likelihood of each character experiencing a series of identical desirable and undesirable events in order to uncover potential optimistic biases. Our study had two goals. First, we wanted to balance the target desirable and undesirable events on four key characteristics, i.e. event frequency, controllability, emotional intensity and personal experience with the event. Second, we wanted to investigate whether stereotypes of warmth and competence could influence the respondents’ likelihood estimates for each character. We show that respondents manifested a strong desirability bias, expecting more desirable than undesirable events for the in-group member and the reverse pattern for the extreme out-group member. More important, we show that, within desirable and undesirable events, respondents anchored their judgments for the in-group member on their personal experience with the target events, further revealing an egocentric bias, but turned to stereotypical knowledge in the form of warmth and competence to judge out-group members. Implications for both social perception and optimism research are discussed.

optimism bias, i.e. expecting the future to hold more desirable than undesirable outcomes, also extends to people that we like or admire. However, it remains unknown how the brain generates this social optimism bias. in this study, respondents estimated the likelihood of future desirable and undesirable outcomes for an in-group and three out-groups: warm-incompetent, cold-competent, and cold-incompetent. We found a strong social optimism bias for the in-group and the warm outgroup and an inverted pattern for the cold-incompetent out-group. for all groups, scores of social optimism bias correlated with the brain activity in structures that respondents differentially engaged depending on the target social group. in line with our hypotheses, evaluating the in-group recruited the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex, whereas evaluating the warm out-group engaged the posterior insula, mid cingulate cortex, and somatosensory cortices. these findings suggest different underlying cognitive mechanisms of social optimism bias for these groups, despite similar behavioural patterns. thinking about the cold out-groups recruited the right anterior temporal lobe, and temporoparietal junction. evaluating the cold-incompetent out-group additionally recruited the anterior insula, inferior frontal cortex and dorsomedial frontal cortex. We discuss these neuroimaging findings with respect to their putative cognitive functions. Human minds are highly capable of solving problems at hand, anticipating prospective issues and benefits, and planning accordingly. At the core of these skills lies the capacity to gauge the likelihood of future events 1-3. The way we assess the likelihood of future events in the general population is different from how we assess it for ourselves 4-6 , for those close to us 7-10 , and for in-group 11,12 and out-group members 11-19. Through various motivational 20,21 and cognitive mechanisms 22,23 , we manifest an optimism bias whenever we think about our future and the future of those close to us 4,8,10,11,13 but not of acquaintances or dissimilar others 8,11,14,24,25. Specifically, we expect that the future holds significantly more desirable than undesirable outcomes for ourselves and those we identify with 26. Despite a modest body of behavioural research on social optimism bias, i.e. optimism manifested towards people that we like and feel close to, very little is known about how the brain gives rise to this phenomenon 18. The primary focus of the current study was to investigate the neural correlates of group membership-driven optimism biases. To pursue this research aim and inform our hypotheses, we considered the neuroimaging literature on person perception and social cognition. A hallmark of social cognition is that individuals think differently about in-group and out-group members 27-32. Although what determines in-group and out-group membership is flexible and highly contextual 30,33 , people perceive in-group and out-group members as part of different entities wi...

An optimism bias refers to the belief in good things happening to oneself in the future with a higher likelihood than is justified. Social optimism biases extend this concept to groups that one identifies with. Previous literature has found that both personal and social optimism biases are linked to brain structure and task‐related brain function. Less is known about whether optimism biases are also expressed in resting‐state functional connectivity (RSFC). Forty‐two participants completed questionnaires on dispositional personal optimism (which is not necessarily unjustified) and comparative optimism (i.e., whether we see our own future as being rosier than a comparison person's future) and underwent a resting‐state functional magnetic resonance imaging scan. They further undertook an imaginative soccer task in order to assess both their personal and social optimism bias. We tested associations of these data with RSFC within and between 13 networks, using sparse canonical correlation analyses (sCCAs). We found that the primary sCCA component was positively connected to personal and social optimism bias and negatively connected to dispositional personal pessimism. This component was associated with (a) reduced integration of the default mode network, (b) reduced integration of the central executive and salience networks, and (c) reduced segregation between the default mode network and the central executive network. Our finding that optimism biases are linked to RSFC indicates that they may be rooted in neurobiology that exists outside of concurrent tasks. This poses questions as to what the limits of the malleability of such biases may be.

Optimism biases denote the tendency to see future desirable events as being more likely to happen to oneself than undesirable events. Such biases are important for mental health and may extend to other individuals or social groups (social optimism biases). However, little is known about whether social optimism biases relate to brain structure. Using sparse canonical correlation analysis, we associated cortical thickness (assessed by magnetic resonance imaging) with measures of social and personal optimism bias, trait optimism, and related concepts. We identified a defensive self-enhancement dimension that associated significantly and reliably with the cortical thickness of the insula and inferior frontal cortex. This self-enhancement dimension included unfavorable biases toward unpopular out-groups and indicators of personal optimism and pessimism. A shared biological substrate underlying future expectancies that subserves the promotion of the self and the denigration of unpopular out-groups may render society-wide efforts to counteract stereotyping particularly difficult: Such efforts may hinder the establishment of adaptive personal optimism biases.

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Perceptual decision-making on emotions involves gathering sensory information about the affective state of another person and forming a decision on the likelihood of a particular state. These perceptual decisions can be of varying complexity as determined by different contexts. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging and a region of interest approach to investigate the brain activation and functional connectivity behind two forms of perceptual decision-making. More complex unbiased decisions on affective voices recruited an extended bilateral network consisting of the posterior inferior frontal cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex, the amygdala, and voice-sensitive areas in the auditory cortex. Less complex biased decisions on affective voices distinctly recruited the right mid inferior frontal cortex, pointing to a functional distinction in this region following decisional requirements. Furthermore, task-induced neural connectivity revealed stronger connections between these frontal, auditory, and limbic regions during unbiased relative to biased decision-making on affective voices. Together, the data shows that different types of perceptual decision-making on auditory emotions have distinct patterns of activations and functional coupling that follow the decisional strategies and cognitive mechanisms involved during these perceptual decisions.

Accounts of empathy distinguish between cognitive (attribution of mental states to a social target) and emotional (sharing of emotions with a social target) empathy. To date, however, little is known about whether and how (interactions between) person perceptions, situational characteristics, and the observer-target relationship affect these constructs. The current study hence investigated (a) how the perceived warmth and competence of different social targets relate to both types of empathy, (b) whether there are differences in empathic responding to positive vs. negative scenarios, and (c) the impact of identification with the social targets. Eighty-nine participants rated cognitive and emotional empathy regarding four stereotypical target characters (student, elderly person, businessperson, alcoholic person) facing diverse positive and negative events. They also rated how warm and competent these characters appeared to them and how strongly they identified with the social targets. Results for cognitive and emotional empathy were partly overlapping, but demonstrated several significant differences, thereby demonstrating the need to investigate the two concepts separately. Notably, stereotypes of warmth predicted both cognitive and emotional empathic responses more strongly in desirable than in undesirable scenarios, which may relate to greater freedom of response to positive (rather than negative) social outcomes permitted by society. Our data show that scenario valence mattered even more for cognitive (than for emotional) empathy because it additionally moderated the effects of perceived competence and social identification. Finally, both cognitive and emotional empathy increased as a positive function of social identification, and social identification moderated effects exerted by perceived warmth and competence (yet differently for the two types of empathy investigated). Together, these findings speak to empathic responses arising from a complex interplay between perceptions (i.e., warmth and competence), scenario valence, and social identification.