Studies of task switching demonstrate that task switches are associated with response costs and that these costs are reduced when a cue is presented in advance of a switch. The present study examined cortical event-related potential correlates of task switching and switch costs in 39 participants during a cued match/mismatch discrimination task. Compared with non-switch trials, switch trials were associated with a larger cue-related, anticipatory P3b-like waveform. Switch trials were also associated with smaller target-related, stimulus-dependent P2 and P3-like components. Moreover, the switch-related amplitude variability in the P3b to the cue and the P2 to the target were associated with unique components of the residual switch costs. The results support an integrated model of task switching with complementary yet distinct roles for anticipatory and stimulus-dependent processes in task switching and switch costs.

Humans are able to monitor their actions for behavioral conflicts and performance errors. Growing evidence suggests that the error-related negativity (ERN) of the event-related cortical brain potential (ERP) may index the functioning of this response monitoring system and that the ERN may depend on dopaminergic mechanisms. We examined the role of dopamine in ERN and behavioral indices of learning by administering either 3 mg of the dopamine antagonist (DA) haloperidol (n = 17); 25 mg of diphenhydramine (n = 16), which has a similar CNS profile but without DA properties; or placebo (n = 18) in a randomized, double-blind manner to healthy volunteers. Three hours after drug administration, participants performed a go/no-go Continuous Performance Task, the Eriksen Flanker Task, and a learning-dependent Time Estimation Task. Haloperidol significantly attenuated ERN amplitudes recorded during the flanker task, impaired learning of time intervals, and tended to cause more errors of commission, compared to placebo, which did not significantly differ from diphenhydramine. Drugs had no significant effects on the stimulus-locked P1 and N2 ERPs or on behavioral response latencies, but tended to affect post-error reaction time (RT) latencies in opposite ways (haloperidol decreased and diphenhydramine increased RTs). These findings support the hypothesis that the DA system is involved in learning and the generation of the ERN.

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Inspiration is a motivational state that compels individuals to bring ideas into fruition. Creators have long argued that inspiration is important to the creative process, but until recently, scientists have not investigated this claim. In this article, we review challenges to the study of creative inspiration, as well as solutions to these challenges afforded by theoretical and empirical work on inspiration over the past decade. First, we discuss the problem of definitional ambiguity, which has been addressed through an integrative process of construct conceptualization. Second, we discuss the challenge of how to operationalize inspiration. This challenge has been overcome by the development and validation of the Inspiration Scale (IS), which may be used to assess trait or state inspiration. Third, we address ambiguity regarding how inspiration differs from related concepts (creativity, insight, positive affect) by discussing discriminant validity. Next, we discuss the preconception that inspiration is less important than “perspiration” (effort), and we review empirical evidence that inspiration and effort both play important—but different—roles in the creative process. Finally, with many challenges overcome, we argue that the foundation is now set for a new generation of research focused on neural underpinnings. We discuss potential challenges to and opportunities for the neuroscientific study of inspiration. A better understanding of the biological basis of inspiration will illuminate the process through which creative ideas “fire the soul,” such that individuals are compelled to transform ideas into products and solutions that may benefit society.

There is a popular hypothesis that performance on implicit and explicit memory tasks reflects 2 distinct memory systems. Explicit memory is said to store those experiences that can be consciously recollected, and implicit memory is said to store experiences and affect subsequent behavior but to be unavailable to conscious awareness. Although this division based on awareness is a useful taxonomy for memory tasks, the authors review the evidence that the unconscious character of implicit memory does not necessitate that it be treated as a separate system of human memory. They also argue that some implicit and explicit memory tasks share the same memory representations and that the important distinction is whether the task (implicit or explicit) requires the formation of a new association. The authors review and critique dissociations from the behavioral, amnesia, and neuroimaging literatures that have been advanced in support of separate explicit and implicit memory systems by highlighting contradictory evidence and by illustrating how the data can be accounted for using a simple computational memory model that assumes the same memory representation for those disparate tasks. Keywords consciousness; implicit; explicit; dissociation; primingThe distinction between implicit and explicit memory has fueled a great deal of research regarding the nature of human memory. Defined in terms of their presupposed distinction, perhaps the most well-known definitions of implicit and explicit memory were proposed by Schacter (1987, p. 501) who said that "implicit memory is revealed when previous experiences facilitate performance on a task that does not require conscious or intentional recollection of those experiences," whereas "explicit memory is revealed when performance on a task requires conscious recollection of previous experiences." Whereas implicit memory is often measured in terms of a repetition priming effect (improved accuracy and/or reaction times for repeated stimuli) in fragment completion, lexical decision, naming, and word identification tasks, explicit memory tasks typically measure performance in recognition or recall tasks. Thus, the distinction between the phenomena labeled as implicit and explicit memory can be understood in terms of whether a memory task requires a recollection of a prior experience.

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The primary aim of this research was to determine how modulation of the visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) by emotionally laden faces is related to autism spectrum personality traits. Emotionally neutral faces served as the standard stimuli and happy and sad expressions served as vMMN-eliciting deviants. Consistent with prior research, it was anticipated that the amplitude of the vMMN would be increased for emotionally salient stimuli. Extending this finding, it was expected that this emotion-based amplitude sensitivity of the vMMN would be decreased in individuals with higher levels of autism spectrum personality traits as measured by the Adult Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). Higher AQ scores were associated with smaller amplitudes of the vMMN in response to happy, but not sad emotional deviants. The fact that higher AQ scores were associated with less sensitivity only to happy emotional expressions is interpreted to be consistent with the negative experience of social interactions reported by individuals who are high on the autism spectrum. This research suggests that the vMMN elicited by deviant emotional expressions may be a useful indicator of affective reactivity and may thus be related to social competency in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD).

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