Cognitive-experiential self-theory integrates the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious by assuming the existence of two parallel, interacting modes of information processing: a rational system and an emotionally driven experiential system. Support for the theory is provided by the convergence of a wide variety of theoretical positions on two similar processing modes; by real-life phenomena--such as conflicts between the heart and the head; the appeal of concrete, imagistic, and narrative representations; superstitious thinking; and the ubiquity of religion throughout recorded history--and by laboratory research, including the prediction of new phenomena in heuristic reasoning.

Two studies provide evidence for the reliability and validity of a new self-report measure of individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking based on cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST). The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) was constructed to measure the 2 independent processing modes with a modified Need for Cognition Scale (NFC, J.T. Cacioppo & R.E. Petty, 1982) and a new scale, Faith in Intuition (FI). In Study 1, a factor analysis yielded 2 orthogonal factors corresponding to NFC and FI. Although heuristic processing was determined primarily by FI, NFC also contributed to heuristic responding, in line with CEST. The relation of FI and NFC to coping ability also was examined. In Study 2, the factor structure of the REI was replicated (N = 973). NFC and FI were differentially related to measures of personality, adjustment, achievement, and interpersonal relations.

A new version of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI), which measures rational and experiential thinking styles and includes subscales of self-reported ability and engagement, was examined in two studies. In Study 1, the two main scales were independent, and they and their subscales exhibited discriminant validity and contributed to the prediction of a variety of measures beyond the contribution of the Big Five scales. A rational thinking style was most strongly and directly related to Ego Strength, Openness, Conscientiousness, and favorable basic beliefs about the self and the world, and it was most strongly inversely related to Neuroticism and Conservatism. An experiential thinking style was most strongly directly related to Extraversion, Agreeableness, Favorable Relationships Beliefs, and Emotional Expressivity, and it was most strongly inversely related to Categorical Thinking, Distrust of Others, and Intolerance. In Study 2, a rational thinking style was inversely related and an experiential thinking style was unrelated to nonoptimal responses in a game of chance. It was concluded that the new REI is a significant improvement over the previous version and measures unique aspects of personality.

One of the classic debates in psychology concerns the stability of personality. With rare exception, studies that have correlated objective behavior on two occasions have obtained coefficients below .30. Not only has the direct measurement of objective behavior failed to provide evidence of stability, but selfreport scales in attitude and personality inventories, as well as ratings of behavioral samples by judges (although themselves stable), have produced low correlations with objective behavior. Does this indicate, as some have suggested, that stability of behavior lies primarily in the eye of the beholder? The issue can be resolved by recognizing that most single items of behavior have a high component of error of measurement and a narrow range of generality. In four separate studies it was demonstrated that when measures of behavior are averaged over an increasing number of events, stability coefficients increase to high levels for all kinds of data, including objective behavior, selfratings, and ratings by others, and that objective behavior can then be reliably related to self-report measures, including standard personality inventories. The observation that it is normally not possible to predict single instances of behavior, but that it is possible to predict behavior averaged over a sample of situations and/or occasions, has important implications not only for the study of personality but for psychological research in general.

Running head: Cognitive-experiential self-theory Author's Note This chapter includes material from several other chapters and articles as well as new information.

Is there a need for a self-concept in psychology? Almost from the beginning, the field has been divided on this question. From a behavioristic viewpoint, the self-concept has an aura of mysticism about it, appearing not far removed from the concept of a soul. One can neither see a self-concept, nor touch it, and no one has succeeded as yet in adequately denning it as a hypothetical construct. Definitions that are offered tend to lack meaningful referents or to be circular. Thus, the self has been defined in terms of the "I" or the "me," or both, or as the individual's reactions to himself. Some authors, apparently having despaired of providing an adequate definition, dispense with the matter by an appeal to common sense and by asserting that everyone knows he has a self as surely as he knows what belongs to him and what does not. Allport (19SS), in an attempt to make a fresh start, coined a new word, the "proprium," which he defined as "all the regions of our life that we regard as peculiarly ours [p. 40]." The difficulty here is that one cannot identify the proprium until one identifies what people regard as essentially theirs, which, in effect, requires identification of the self. One occasionally detects a note of authoritative assertiveness in place of logical analysis when an author feels certain he knows what the self is, but finds it a slippery concept whose adequate definition is irritatingly elusive. Thus, Sullivan (1953) stated,

a series of studies on stability of behavior reported in a previous article (Epstein, 1979c). That article is concerned with the issue of stability in personality, one of the classic debates in psychology. It will be helpful to review briefly the issue and the studies reported in the article before proceeding further.Mischel, the current leading proponent of the antitrait position, observed that when objectively measured behavior in one situation is correlated with objectively measured behavior in another situation or with scores on a personality inventory, the correlations are almost invariably below .30.

When offered an opportunity to win $1 on every "win" trial in which they drew a red jelly bean, subjects frequently elected to draw from a bowl that contained a greater absolute number, but a smaller proportion, of red beans (e.g., 7 in 100) than from a bowl with fewer red beans but better odds (e.g., 1 in 10). Subjects reported that although they knew the probabilities were against them, they felt they had a better chance when there were more red beans. Similar, but less extreme results were obtained on "lose" trials, where drawing a red bean meant losing $1. These results were predicted from the concretive and experiential principles of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Nonoptimal choices in the laboratory were significantly correlated with heuristic responses to relevant vignettes and with self-reported gambling in real life.