Continuous flash suppression (CFS) has been used as a paradigm to probe the extent to which word stimuli are processed in the absence of awareness. In the two experiments reported here, no evidence is obtained that word stimuli are processed up to the semantic level when suppressed through CFS. In Experiment 1, word stimuli did not break suppression faster than their pseudo-word variants nor was suppression time modulated by word frequency. Experiment 2 replicated these findings, but more critically showed that differential effects can be obtained with this paradigm using a simpler stimulus. In addition, pixel density of the stimuli did prove to be related to suppression time in both experiments, indicating that the paradigm is sensitive to differences in detectability. A third and final experiment replicated the well-known face inversion effect using the same set-up as Experiments 1 and 2, thereby demonstrating that the employed methodology can capture more high-level effects as well. These results are discussed in the context of previous evidence on unconscious semantic processing and two potential explanations are advanced. Specifically, it is argued that CFS might act at a level too low in the visual system for high-level effects to be observed or that the widely used breaking CFS paradigm is merely ill-suited to capture effects in the context of words.

The present research examines the nature of the different processes that have been proposed to underlie semantic priming. Specifically, it has been argued that priming arises as a result of automatic target activation and/or the use of strategies like prospective expectancy generation and retrospective semantic matching. This article investigates the extent that these processes rely on cognitive resources by experimentally manipulating working memory load. To disentangle prospective and retrospective processes, prime-target pairs were selected such that they were symmetrically associated (e.g., answer-question; SYM) or asymmetrically associated in either the forward direction (e.g., panda-bear; FA) or the backward direction (e.g., ball-catch; BA). The results showed that priming for FA pairs completely evaporated under a high working memory load but that it remained stable for BA and SYM pairs. This was taken to mean that prospective processes, which are assumed to cause FA priming, require cognitive resources, whereas retrospective processes, which lead to BA priming, are relatively effortless.

The present study investigated people’s understanding of underinformative sentences like ‘Some oaks are trees’. Specifically, the scalar term ‘some’ can be interpreted pragmatically, Not all oaks are trees, or logically, some and possibly all oaks are trees. The aim of this study was to capture the interindividual variability in the interpretation of such sentences. In two experiments, participants provided truth value judgments for 20 underinformative sentences on which a latent class analysis was performed. The results revealed three latent classes: a consistent pragmatic group, a consistent logical group and an inconsistent group. Furthermore, we examined whether this interindividual variability could be explained by text characteristics, response times, cognitive abilities and personality traits. The results showed that only participants’ response times to the underinformative sentences could predict class membership. Specifically, the slower participants responded, the more likely they were to interpret underinformative sentences consistently pragmatic or inconsistent instead of consistently logical.

Science is often perceived to be a self-correcting enterprise. In principle, the assessment of scientific claims is supposed to proceed in a cumulative fashion, with the reigning theories of the day progressively approximating truth more accurately over time. In practice, however, cumulative self-correction tends to proceed less efficiently than one might naively suppose. Far from evaluating new evidence dispassionately and infallibly, individual scientists often cling stubbornly to prior findings. Here we explore the dynamics of scientific self-correction at an individual rather than collective level. In 13 written statements, researchers from diverse branches of psychology share why and how they have lost confidence in one of their own published findings. We qualitatively characterize these disclosures and explore their implications. A cross-disciplinary survey suggests that such loss-of-confidence sentiments are surprisingly common among members of the broader scientific population yet rarely become part of the public record. We argue that removing barriers to self-correction at the individual level is imperative if the scientific community as a whole is to achieve the ideal of efficient self-correction.

The present research investigates semantic priming with an adapted version of the word fragment completion task. In this task, which we refer to as the speeded word fragment completion task, participants need to complete words such as lett_ce (lettuce), from which one letter was omitted, as quickly as possible. This paradigm has some interesting qualities in comparison with the traditionally used lexical decision task. That is, it requires no pseudowords, it is more engaging for participants, and most importantly, it allows for a more fine-grained investigation of semantic activation. In two studies, we found that words were completed faster when the preceding trial comprised a semantically related fragment such as tom_to (tomato) than when it comprised an unrelated fragment such as guit_r (guitar). A third experiment involved a lexical decision task, to compare both paradigms. The results showed that the magnitude of the priming effect was similar, but item-level priming effects were inconsistent over tasks. Crucially, the speeded word fragment completion task obtained strong priming effects for highly frequent, central words, such as work, money, and warm, whereas the lexical decision task did not. In a final experiment featuring only short, highly frequent words, the lexical decision task failed to find a priming effect, whereas the fragment completion task did obtain a robust effect. Taken together, these results suggest that the speeded word fragment completion task may prove a viable alternative for examining semantic priming.

Science is often perceived to be a self-correcting enterprise. In principle, the assessment of scientific claims is supposed to proceed in a cumulative fashion, with the reigning theories of the day progressively approximating truth more accurately over time. In practice, however, cumulative self-correction tends to proceed less efficiently than one might naively suppose. Far from evaluating new evidence dispassionately and infallibly, individual scientists often cling stubbornly to prior findings. Here we explore the dynamics of scientific self-correction at an individual rather than collective level. In thirteen written statements, researchers from diverse branches of psychology share why and how they have lost confidence in a published finding. We qualitatively characterize these disclosures and explore their implications. A cross-disciplinary survey suggests that such loss-of-confidence sentiments are surprisingly common among members of the broader scientific population, yet rarely become part of the public record. We argue that removing barriers to self-correction at the individual level is imperative if the scientific community as a whole is to achieve the ideal of efficient self-correction.

The current study examines the underlying processes of semantic priming using the largest priming database available (i.e., Semantic Priming Project, Hutchison et al. Behavior Research Methods, 45(4), 1099-1114, 2013. Specifically, it compares priming effects in two tasks: lexical decision and pronunciation. Task similarities were assessed at two different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) (i.e., 200 and 1,200 ms) and for both primary and other associates. To evaluate how consistent priming is across these two tasks, item-level priming effects obtained in each task were correlated for each condition separately. The results revealed significant correlations at the short SOA for both primary and other associates. The correlations at the long SOA were significantly smaller and only reached significance when z-transformed response times were used. Furthermore, this pattern remained essentially the same when only asymmetric forward associates (e.g., panda-bear) were considered, suggesting that the cross-task stability at the short SOA was not merely caused by retrospective processes such as semantic matching. Instead, these findings provide evidence for a rapidly operating, item-based, relational characteristic such as spreading activation.

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